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PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF THE
DEPLOYMENT OF SPANISH ARMED FORCES
ABROAD IN THE POST-IRAQ ERA
By YOLANDA GAMARRA*
I. INTRODUCTION
From 1989 to 1999, the participation of the Spanish Armed Forces in
international military operations took place within a context of domestic
normality and international legality.1 However, the Kosovo crisis (1999)
prompted controversy, and the intervention in Iraq (2003) saw the
breakdown of parliamentary consensus. Spain is not alone in this respect.
Abuses committed by United Nations (UN) bodies and the executive
branches of western states in the humanitarian interventions in the 1990s
(Somalia and Kosovo) and non-interventions (Rwanda), and the post-9/
11 handling of Afghanistan and Iraq, prompted national and interna-
tional debates concerning the legality and legitimacy of the use of force
in operations outside of national territory and/or Europe. The post-Iraq
controversy in Spain reflects similar disagreements in other countries,
particularly Britain and the Netherlands.
In Spain, there was strong criticism from the opposition concerning
the lack of an ex ante mechanism for parliamentary control over the
participation of the Armed Forces in Iraq.2 In order to avoid similar
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1 The list of international operations in which Spain has participated can be found in Y Gamarra,
‘The Politics of the Legal Framework governing Spanish Foreign Policy on International
Administration in Crisis Areas’ in O Korhonen (ed), International Administration of Crisis Areas.
Nine National Approaches (KDG Research and Publications 2007) 124–26.
2 See the parliamentary debates on the Kosovo and Iraq crises: I Marrero Rocha, ‘El discurso
jurı´dico internacional en los debates del Congreso de los Diputados: los casos de Kosovo y la guerra
de Irak’ (2005) LVII Revista Espan˜ola de Derecho internacional 49, and La participacio´n de las
Fuerzas Armadas espan˜olas en misiones de paz (Plaza Valde´s 2007); and D Lin˜a´n Nogueras and
J Rolda´n Barbero (eds), El estatuto jurı´dico de las Fuerzas Armadas en el exterior (Plaza Valde´s 2008).
On the use of force see AJ Rodrigo, ‘Between traditional rules and new practices: Spanish practice
regard the use of armed forces (1990–2015)’ (2015) Spanish YB Int’l L 329.
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situations in future, a mandatory political control mechanism was cre-
ated in 2005 concerning the timing and legality of the participation of the
Armed Forces in international operations. Aside from the balance of
forces that is established after each general election, there is a trend
towards improving legislative control of foreign policy, the direction of
which is the responsibility of the executive power.
This article critically reviews the development and impact of parlia-
mentary control in Spain. Part I outlines the constitutional framework
concerning the participation of the Armed Forces in international oper-
ations prior to 2005. Part II explores the development and impact of the
new political control mechanism created in 2005 on both the authorisa-
tion of operations ex ante and the (lack of) budgetary monitoring of
operations once they have been initiated. Part III focuses on the effect-
iveness of parliamentary control and monitoring in influencing both gov-
ernmental decision-making and legislative and public debate. The article
concludes with some thoughts on the scope and limits of parliamentary
control and monitoring of military operations outside of Spanish
territory.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR MILITARY ACTION
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 (hereafter, ‘Constitution’) establishes
that the Cortes Generales are the representatives of the Spanish towns,
and comprise two Chambers: the Senate and the Congress of Deputies
(Parliament). The Congress of Deputies shares the control function with
the Senate, except for matters of defence, which fall to the Congress of
Deputies. The requirement of political responsibility resides in the
Congress of Deputies.3
The participation of Spain in international military operations has its
constitutional basis in the combination and joint reading of various art-
icles of the Constitution:
. article 8(1), which sets out the mission of the Armed Forces;
. article 63(3), which grants the King the power, on the authorization of the
Cortes Generales, to declare war and make peace;
. article 94(1), which requires the authorization of the Cortes Generales
prior to the giving of the state’s consent to entry into various treaties
and agreements, including military treaties;
. article 96(1), which provides that validly concluded international treaties,
once officially published in Spain, shall be part of the internal legal
system; and
3 For more information, see JR Montero Gibert and J Garcı´a Morillo, El control parlamentario
(Tecnos 1984) 43ff; and J Sole Tura and MA Aparicio, Las Cortes Generales en el sistema constitu-
cional (Tecnos 1984).
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. article 97, which provides that the Government shall conduct domestic
and foreign policy, civil and military administration and the defence of
the State.
Article 8(1) of the Constitution establishes that the mission of the
Armed Forces (comprising Army, Navy and Air Force) is to guarantee
the sovereignty and independence of Spain, and to defend its territorial
integrity and the constitutional order. In light of the diverse circum-
stances in which the Armed Forces have been deployed,4 the interpret-
ation of article 8(1) has given rise to a controversy about whether its
description of the Armed Forces’ mission is exhaustive.5
On 24 October 1995 the Congress of Deputies approved a resolution
that included the conditions for participation by Spain in operations
under the mandate of the UN.6 Measures adopted by the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) in accordance with Chapter VII of
the UN Charter would be considered directly enforceable in Spanish
law. The said resolution also indicated that the participation of Spain
in UN peace operations was in keeping with the Constitution. One year
later, on 14 November 1996, and in tandem with Spain’s full integration
into the military structure of NATO, Parliament approved a resolution
concerning a communication by the Government about Spain’s partici-
pation in the renewed Atlantic Alliance.7 It could therefore be inferred
that the function of the Armed Forces went beyond that stated in article
8(1) of the Constitution.
On 21 March 2003, the Government authorised the sending of a joint
unit of the Armed Forces to Iraq for humanitarian aid, along with units
from the Air Force for the defence of Turkey, within the scope of agree-
ments reached in NATO, and subject to a time limit of three months.
Spain offered logistical and humanitarian assistance, although the
Spanish Armed Forces did not participate in ‘open hostilities’. The
then President appeared before Parliament on 26 March 2003 to explain
the deployment of a fleet to the scene of the conflict for humanitarian
purposes. The parliamentary opposition as one rejected the unilateral
support offered by the Spanish Government to the British–American
coalition. Spanish participation in Iraq did not have either the consensus
4 Today, the functions of the Spanish Armed Forces, like the military forces of many comparable
states, are projected in the management of areas in crisis at the international level. On this particular
see F Lo´pez Ramo´n, ‘La evolucio´n democra´tica de la Defensa Nacional’ (2007) 80 Revista Espan˜ola
de Derecho Constitucional 11.
5 L Cotino Hueso, ‘La posicio´n de las Cortes en el a´mbito militar y de la defensa (Atencio´n
particular a la reciente experiencia de la crisis de Kosovo)’ (2000) 9 Corts. Anuario de Derecho
Parlamentario 253.
6 Los nuevos retos y la reforma institucional de las Naciones Unidas. Resolution approved by the
Congress of Deputies, 24 October 1995, BOCG, Congress of Deputies, V Legislature, Serie E, nº
178, 22 November 1995, 1–5. The resolution is of a recommendatory, rather than binding, nature.
7 Resolution on the communication from the Government on the participation of Spain in the
renewed Atlantic Alliance, D.S. del Congreso de los Diputados, Pleno y Diputacio´n Permanente, VI
Legislature, (1996) 39, 1706.
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of Parliament or of the public. The operation in Iraq exceeded the func-
tions specified in article 8(1) of the Constitution and, insofar as it did not
have the mandate of the UNSC, exceeded the operations envisaged in
the resolution of 24 October 1995.
The participation of the Spanish Armed Forces in Iraq might have
been legally justified on the basis of article 63(3) of the Constitution.
This article gives the King, as head of the Spanish state, the power to
declare war and make peace, conditional on the previous authorisation of
the Cortes Generales. However, to date, this article has never been
invoked to authorise operations abroad. There was no political will to
invoke this provision in connection with Iraq, in part because the article
includes an obsolete formula for declaring war that is not subject to the
limitations of international law.
As can be seen, the Spanish legislative framework grants the President
of the Government, and the Government as a whole, broad prerogatives
to decide upon the sending of Spanish military forces to operations
abroad, within the limitations established in international law and the
treaties to which Spain is a party, and those arising from the general
political framework.
However, it was argued that there should be some requirement for
prior legislative authorisation of military operations abroad. This was
grounded in the fact that, in accordance with Chapter III
(International Treaties) of Title III of the Constitution, most of the
international activity of the state that entails obligations is subject to
control by Parliament, even though the Government is responsible for
the handling of foreign policy (under article 97).8 There are few inter-
national obligations, especially within the military scope of the state, that
are not controlled by Parliament or that are not subject to control.9
Spanish participation in the military operation in Iraq gave rise to a
search for a mechanism that would cover this grey area, and determine
the role of Parliament in situations like Iraq.
III. ORGANIC LAW 5/2005 ON CONTROL AND MONITORING
A. Ex ante control by Parliament
Post-Iraq debates resulted in Organic Law 5/2005 on National Defence
of 17 November 2005 (Organic Law 5/2005).10 Organic Law 5/2005
8 J Garcı´a Ferna´ndez, ‘El control polı´tico de las misiones militares en el exterior: derecho
internacional y derecho interno’ (2003) 9 Newsletter 27.
9 Article 94(1)(b) of the Constitution states the prior authorisation of military treaties and that
the Cortes Generales retain control of ‘executive treaties’ through the institution of requalification.
On the requalification of treaties and the problems raised on this issue, see A Remiro Broto´ns,
Derecho internacional pu´blico. 2. Derecho de los tratados (Tecnos 1987) 121ff.
10 Boletı´n Oficial del Estado (BOE), nº 275, 18 November 2005, available at5https://www.boe.
es/buscar/pdf/2005/BOE-A-2005-18933-consolidado.pdf4. This replaced an earlier Organic Law 6/
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establishes regulations, rules and conditions for the participation of mili-
tary units beyond Spanish borders, and determines the role of the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches concerning the use of the Armed Forces.
It also addresses operations to evacuate Spanish nationals abroad when
circumstances of instability place their lives or interests in serious
danger. In Organic Law 5/2005, the legislative branch curtailed the lati-
tude of the executive in deploying the Armed Forces abroad by requiring
a previous decision by the UN or another regional organisation of which
Spain is a member; and insisting on active participation by the
Parliament in the decision concerning the sending of Armed Forces
abroad.
Article 4(2) of Organic Law 5/2005 establishes that Parliament must
give prior authorisation for the participation of the Armed Forces in
operations outside the national territory, even where operations fall
within article 8(1) of the Constitution. This demonstrates the tendency
of Parliament to act independently of the Senate in the ‘imperfect’
Spanish bicameralism.
Article 19 of Organic Law 5/2005 provides that, in order for the
Spanish Armed Forces to be able to carry out operations abroad that
are not directly related to the defence of Spain or of its national interest,
there must be:
1. an express request from the government of the state where the forces are
going to operate;
2. authorisation from the UNSC in a resolution that does not contradict or
violate the principles of conventional international law that Spain has
included in its legal system, in accordance with article 96(1) of the
Constitution; or
3. an agreement from an international organisation of which Spain is a
member, in particular the EU, NATO, or OSCE.
Article 17 of Organic Law 5/2005 includes a new mechanism for the
authorisation of the participation of the Spanish Armed Forces in oper-
ations abroad. Article 17(1) includes the ‘prior consultation’ and ‘author-
isation’ of all operations carried out abroad that are not directly related to
the defence of Spain. The authorisation of Parliament must be obtained
before the possible participation of the Armed Forces in international
operations. However, article 17(2) provides a special procedure for
missions abroad that, in accordance with international commitments,
require a prompt and immediate response. In such cases, the prior con-
sultation processes may be carried out through emergency procedures.
1980 on national defense and military organization. An Organic Law is a law that derives from the
Constitution, and that usually regulates fundamental rights and key political structures. In general it
is recognised to have a certain superiority over ordinary laws: see X Pons Rafols, ‘El derecho
internacional, la Constitucio´n espan˜ola y la Ley Orga´nica de la Derfensa Nacional’ in H Torroja
Mate´u (ed), Los retos de la seguridad y la defensa en el nuevo contexto internacional (Universitat de
Barcelona 2007) 229.
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The purpose of this provision is to try to avoid criticisms about the
slowness of ordinary parliamentary mechanisms, and to attempt to
obtain an indirect legal mandate from the Cortes Generales so that it
could implement a regulated procedure that details the emergency
cases with parliamentary authorisation.11 In any case, and if for reasons
of urgency it is not possible to make the prior consultation, article 17(3)
requires the Government to submit the decision that it has adopted to
Parliament as soon as possible for its authorisation.
Since 2005, the practice of the executive branch in general terms has
consisted of submitting military operations abroad for the prior ‘consult-
ation’ and ‘authorisation’ of Parliament, sometimes before the plenary
session and sometimes before the Defence Commission.12 The lack of a
regulatory procedural practice for the provisions of Organic Law 5/2005
has led to an absence of standard procedure.13 With the enormous accu-
mulated practice and in view of the difficulty of reforming the Rules of
Procedure (1982),14 perhaps now is the right time to propose the adop-
tion of a parliamentary resolution that would regulate a unique proced-
ure for the authorisation and monitoring of military operations abroad.
In theory, Organic Law 5/2005 provides new constraints on the de-
ployment of Spanish Armed Forces abroad. However, as mentioned
above, article 17(2) permits the executive branch to request ex post au-
thorisation from Parliament, once the executive branch has ordered the
participation of the Armed Forces in an international operation. It seems
logical to consider that this provision should be limited to situations
which are exceptional, or in which the needs for assistance are acute,
although even if such interpretations are adopted, the exception can end
up becoming the rule. Article 17(2) has been invoked in the case of the
earthquake in Haiti (2010), Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya (2011),
and EUTM Mali (2013), among others (the Libyan operation being the
only post-Iraq deployment involving the use of force). Moreover, some
deployments (such as military units to provide protection in the con-
struction of an internment centre for immigrants in Mauritania in
2006, or a P-3 Orion patrol aircraft to the coast of Somalia to prevent
pirate attacks in 2008), were not submitted for the prior authorisation of
Parliament. It was considered that these were operations carried out
under the framework of executive agreements.
11 Following the thesis of J Xucla´ i Costa and A Mª Pla i Boix, ‘La autorizacio´n y control
parlamentario de las misiones del eje´rcito en el exterior: la falta de un procedimiento comu´n’
(2008) 74 Revista de las Cortes Generales 23.
12 V Moret Milla´s, La autorizacio´n de las operaciones en el exterior de las fuerzas armadas: una
propuesta de regulacio´n parlamentaria. Premio de Defensa 2013, “Jose´ Francisco Querol y
Lombardo” (Ministerio de Defensa 2013) 23-26.
13 The common procedural element upon which this disparity is based is due to the ‘lack of
regulatory measures’ of articles 31(1), points 4 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure. See Xucla´ i Costa
and Pla i Boix, ‘La autorizacio´n y control parlamentario’, 33.
14 See RI Rodrı´guez Magdaleno, La participacio´n de las Cortes Generales en la accio´n exterior del
Estado (1979–2011) (Congreso de los Diputados 2015) 313.
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The Spanish legislative branch still falls short in the monitoring of
foreign and defence policy in comparison with other European legislative
branches. However, using the authorisation procedure, the legislative
branch participates to a certain degree with the executive branch in the
job of managing the state’s foreign policy. This results in a legal foreign
policy that is more democratically integrated and, by extension, to an
international law with greater legitimacy. However, in the debates of
MPs, references to international law are scarce, shallow, and even am-
bivalent. Most MPs are not lawyers, and very few are international law-
yers. Their arguments are focused on defending the legality of the
operation if it has a mandate from an international organisation, in ac-
cordance with Organic Law 5/2005. Using the language of the UNSC,
the executive persuades the legislature to authorise the deployment of the
Armed Forces abroad on a case-by-case basis.
B. Monitoring military action
Article 18 of Organic Law 5/2005 stipulates that the executive branch
shall regularly report to Parliament, within a time period that never ex-
ceeds one year, concerning the conduct of Armed Forces operations
abroad. In view of the freedom of the Government to decide to send
Armed Forces abroad, Organic Law 5/2005 obliges the executive branch
to give explanations for sending troops to high-risk areas. Control and
monitoring by the legislative branch act as a deterrent to the sending of
forces, and in theory minimises the extension of periods of deployment,
costs, and mission (where mixed civilian–military forces are sent). It is
not always an easy task to justify the presence of the Spanish Armed
Forces in places like Afghanistan, Chad, Mali or Iraq, where Spain ap-
parently does not have direct interests.
From 2006 to October 2017 the Minister of Defence made nine ap-
pearances before the Defence Commission to inform it about the oper-
ations of the Spanish Armed Forces abroad. The sequence of
appearances was interrupted on two occasions: once in 2011, due to
the holding of general elections and the arrival of a new conservative
Government, and once in 2015, because the lack of a majority in the
Congress of Deputies stopped the Partido Popular from gaining suffi-
cient votes to form a government. This delayed the appearance of the
Minister of Defence by one year, to December 2016.
In general, the various political groups maintain a constructive pos-
ition concerning the obligation to report on the progress and cost of
operations in which Spain participates. There is no disagreement on
the essential points of defence policy with the main opposition party,
regardless of the political ideology of the governing party, although criti-
cism has risen from left-wing MPs concerning the lack of information
and transparency regarding the carrying out of various operations.
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In the years when the socialist party governed (2004–11), legal dis-
course was marked by its ‘determinist’ and ‘eclectic’ character.15 The
discourse was the same as during the first term of the conservative
party. There were constant critical voices from representatives of several
opposition parties. One MP from the conservative party, Asuncio´n
Oltra, condemned the conduct of the Minister of Defence of the socialist
group for having approved operations without them appearing to be
urgent and without the mandatory parliamentary authorisation under
article 17(1) of Organic Law 5/2005.16
However, the most severe criticisms came from the left. In his various
appearances before the Defence Commission, the left-wing MP Gaspar
Llamazares Trigo took a critical position concerning the participation of
the Spanish Armed Forces in operations abroad. In the first appearance
by the Minister of Defence, Jose´ Bono, the driving force behind the
approval of Organic Law 5/2005, to report on the operations of the
Armed Forces abroad, Llamazares recognised the value of the aforemen-
tioned law and backed the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq as a
‘fundamental’ basis of the new foreign policy and of the new policy on
the participation of Spanish troops in international operations required
for the future.17 Llamazares especially expressed his distrust of ‘sliding’
missions and timeframes that exceeded what the legislative branch had
initially authorized. Llamazares called for the Minister to provide more
information, and for greater access to both public and restricted infor-
mation (concerning military intelligence). He stressed an element that
had been proposed previously, which was a certain bureaucratic process-
ing of authorisations for troops abroad, as in the case of Somalia. In that
case, Llamazares complained, parliamentary authorisation should have
been requested before the sending of troops and not after the
deployment.18
In the appearance of the Minister of Defence on 20 December 2016,
there was a qualitative advance in the information provided. The con-
servative Minister, Marı´a Dolores de Cospedal, included references not
only to operations, their limits and successes, and the work of Spain, but
also to the total cost in absolute figures of each international operation in
which the Spanish Armed Forces were participating.19
Questions about the actual cost of Armed Forces operations abroad,
and not just the cost that appears in the General State Budget, have been
15 See Marrero Rocha, ‘El discurso jurı´dico internacional’, 74ff.
16 Appearance of Asuncio´n Oltra Torres, Diary of Sessions of the Congress of Deputies, Defence
Commission, VIII Legislature, 14 March 2006, 15, available at5http://www.congreso.es/public_
oficiales/L8/CONG/DS/CO/CO_509.PDF#page¼144.
17 Appearance of Gaspar Llamazares Trigo, Diary of Sessions of the Congress of Deputies,
Defence Commission, XI Legislature, 14 March 2016, 11.
18 Appearance of Gaspar Llamazares Trigo, Diary of Sessions of the Congress of Deputies,
Defence Commission, IX Legislature, 10 December 2008, 14.
19 Appearence of Marı´a Dolores de Cospedal, Diary of Sessions of the Congress of Deputies,
Defence Commission, XII Legislature, 20 December 2016.
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repeated year after year since 2006, when the conservative MPMardones
Sevilla demanded not only information about the political repercussion
of sending troops to crisis areas, but also to know the itemised cost of
each operation.20 This matter was also raised by the centre-liberal party,
Unio´n, Progreso y Democracia (UPyD), on repeated occasions, espe-
cially by the MP Irene Lozano Domingo, who discovered the difference
between the 14 million euros budgeted for 2014 in the State General
Budget and the final (actual) expenditure of between 600 and 700 million
euros. Lozano Domingo thought that the actual expenditure was arbi-
trary and saw it as an impediment to rigorous budgetary control.21 In
2017, the Minister of Defence forecasts that operations abroad will cost
1,063 billion euros, compared to 771 million euros in 2016.22
Amounts allocated for military operations can be increased up to the
sum that covers the respective obligations,23 funded against the
Budgetary Contingency Fund or against other credits in the non-finan-
cial budget.24 The Ministry of Finance and Civil Service is empowered
to authorise this extra credit.25 Diversions have been a constant practice
since the first year of participation in international missions and have
reached 153.44% above the budgeted amount in 1996, 135.42% in 1999
and 126.99% in 2003.26 Since that year, the practice has been to provide a
low initial credit and then increase it, charged against the Contingency
Fund to increase credit for operations abroad, and provide additional
credit and even extraordinary credit for these types of operations. The
margin for budgetary action concerning the costs of operations abroad is
not so paradoxical, given that it is Parliament itself that grants full free-
dom to the executive branch to increase credit, and empowers the
Ministry of Finance and Civil Service to authorize the extra credit.
Parliament only has information about what this decision means in eco-
nomic terms when the Minister of Finance and Civil Service issues his
quarterly reports about the Contingency Fund. However, the Court of
Auditors,27 which controls extraordinary and additional credit, as well as
increases, transfers and other modifications to budgetary credit, has been
critical of this type of conduct. In its 2010 report, it recognised a lack of
20 Appearance of Luı´s Mardones Sevilla, Diary of Sessions of the Congress of Deputies, Defence
Commission, XI Legislature, 14 March 2016, 10.
21 Appearance of Irene Lozano Domingo, Diary of Sessions of the Congress of Deputies,
Defence Commission, X Legislature, 18 December 2013, 20.
22 See the appearance of the Secretary of State for Defense, Agustı´n Conde Baje´n, Diary of
Sessions of the Congress of Deputies, Defence Commission, XII Legislature, 26 April, 2017, 3 ff.
23 This is contemplated in art 54(1) of Law 47/2003, 26 November 2003, on the General Budget,
BOE nº 284, 27 November 2003.
24 Ibid, art 53(3).
25 Ibid, art 62(1).
26 Percentages obtained from the Defense Budget published by the General Directorate of
Economic Affairs of the Ministry of Defence.
27 Supreme supervisory body for the accounts of the State’s own management and the public
sector: see Organic Law 2/1982, 12 May 1982, of the Court of Auditors, BOE nº 121, 21 May 1982.
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quality (irregularity) in the ability of Parliament to control budgetary
items used for operations by the Armed Forces abroad.28
MPs have also raised questions about the scope of the Parliament’s
control over operations when these change in nature, depending on the
volatile situation on the ground. In 2014, the socialist MP Diego Lo´pez
Garrido asked about one of the key aspects not covered by Organic Law
5/2005, namely: what would the operational control of Spanish troops
be? Who would do it? Furthermore, and in a clear reference to the op-
eration in Iraq: what would the status of the forces be? What would the
rules of engagement be? What would the risk assessment be? He was here
expressing an important concern for the safety of Spanish troops in
places like Iraq, the Central African Republic and Lebanon.29 The
status of forces, and instruments for the protetion of the operation and
its members, are often overlooked. All of these questions lead us to think
that there is still room to improve the monitoring procedure and, there-
fore, the transparency of Spanish participation abroad, regardless of its
nature.
IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL AND MONITORING
A. Effects of pressure and persuasion on governmental decision-making
There have been doubts about whether the procedures set out in Organic
Law 5/2005 are more about good intentions and less about the verifica-
tion of compliance with internal regulations and international obliga-
tions.30 Control and monitoring procedures must be effective, or the
function and usefulness of Parliament would be called into question.
In general, parliamentary control has a dual objective: to agree positions
(on foreign policy) among the various political groups, and to verify the
constitutionality of operations depending on the international commit-
ments that have been made. The monitoring procedure acts through
cooperation, dialogue and understanding. In practical terms, the purpose
of debates in the Defence Commission, and their public nature, is to
dissuade the executive from involving the Spanish Armed Forces in op-
erations with a high risk of human losses. In the long term the effect-
iveness of this monitoring might be measured by the degree of
acceptance by the public of participation of the Spanish Armed Forces
in military operations abroad, and the costs and risks this entails.
Parliamentary debates exercise a political and moral pressure, the so-
called mobilisation of shame, regarding the decisions of the executive
branch. Practice has shown that public debates in Parliament generate
28 Report available at5http://www.congreso.es/docu/inf_fiscTC/251-5.pdf4.
29 Appearance of Diego Lo´pez Garrido, Diary of Sessions of the Congress of Deputies, Defence
Commission, X Legislature, 17 December 2014, 26.
30 Xucla´ i Costa and Pla i Boix, ‘La autorizacio´n y control parlamentario’, 10–12.
10 of 15 PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/bybil/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/bybil/bry019/5100735 by guest on 09 D
ecem
ber 2018
political and moral pressure on the executive branch and accelerate re-
forms, and this may help in the correction of practices that are against the
Spanish and international law. The public nature of debates in the
Defence Commission mobilises the executive branch to reconsider the
situation created. The executive branch does not like being criticised by
members of the opposition, because it represents a major loss of face to
the Spanish public and affects international public opinion.
Therefore, in situations of doubtful constitutionality and the violation
of international law, in particular international humanitarian law, the
executive branch is forced to provide explanations for its actions and a
domestic political game is created that the parties in power do not like
very much.31 Legal doctrine warns that, if the executive branch shares
the power to decide and control the use of force with other bodies, the
joint action of these bodies ends up affecting the electoral impact and
tends to support Parliament as the place where responsibility should be
demanded.32
In appearances in 2012 and 2014, the Defence Minister Pedro
Morene´s Eulate, from the conservative party, defended Spanish partici-
pation in operations abroad to guarantee the security of Spain, world
stability, national reliability and credibility, and even defended the
Spanish presence in certain crisis areas for ‘the good of the global econ-
omy’.33 According to the Minister, Spanish participation in international
operations was helping to make the world both safer and more econom-
ically stable. A leftist representative, Centella Go´mez, on the other hand,
asserted that Spanish participation in international operations militarises
policies of cooperation, removes resources allocated to mutual, civic co-
operation, and does not always help to make the world safer and more
stable.34 In the end, there was a debate regarding the change that the
concept of defence versus safety had undergone in recent decades.
In general terms, however, there is an agreed continuity regarding
Spanish participation in international operations, provided that Spain
operates in accordance with the Constitution and domestic law, as well
as with international law and, in particular, with international humani-
tarian law.
Debates by MPs concerning the intervention in Libya—the only post-
Iraq operation that has required the use of force—took place after the
sending of the Spanish Armed Forces to the zone of operations. On 22
March 2011, the plenary session of Parliament authorised Spanish
31 B Russett and J Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International
Organizations (Norton 2011) 54.
32 H Ha¨nggi, ‘The use of force under International auspices: parliamentary accountability and
“democratic deficits”’ in H Born and H Ha¨nggi (eds), The ‘Double democratic deficit’. Parliamentary
accountability and the use of force under International auspices (Ashgate 2004) 3.
33 Appearance of Pedro Morene´s Eulate, Diary of Sessions of the Congress of Deputies, Defence
Commission, X Legislature, 16 May 2012, 26.
34 Appearance of Jose´ Luis Centella Go´mez, Diary of Sessions of the Congress of Deputies,
Defence Commission, X Legislature, 16 May 2012, 18.
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participation in the international intervention in Libya just five days
after the executive branch had approved and deployed military capabil-
ities. This circumstance was no accident, given that, as there were certain
similarities between the intervention in Libya and Iraq, the executive
branch avoided an embarrassing situation (and political damage). The
President attended the plenary session. Of the 340 MPs present, only
three voted against and one abstained due to an error. The socialist
President, Jose´ Luis Rodrı´guez Zapatero, insisted on the obligation of
Spain to contribute to compliance with international law by following
UNSC resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011).
This position had its supporters and critics. On the one hand, the then
leader of the conservative group in the opposition, Mariano Rajoy,
approved the decision of the President to involve Spain in the ‘war in
Libya’. However, he warned of the risk that the conflict could result in a
prolonged civil war.35 On the other hand, Llamazares, a long-standing
critic of military operations, stated that at that time there were over
thirty conflicts with very similar characteristics to the war in Libya,
with despotic Governments that were exterminating part of their own
people and, exceptionally, in this specific case, the international commu-
nity was imposing a war as a solution.36 The MP stated that the oper-
ation represented the beginning of a new phase of international politics,
in which zones of interest were divided up with the support of some and
the consent or abstention of others.37
In the debates in Parliament regarding the authorisation of the oper-
ation, and reports on its progress, there was no questioning of interna-
tional law. Rather, it was assumed that anything approved within the
institutional frameworks of the UN, NATO or the EU was valid.38
The parliamentary debate concerning the intervention in Libya, like
the others, was formally respectful of international law (legality) and
the responsibility to protect (R2P) (legitimacy) without much criticism
about the effects of interventions on international law.
The public debates of the Defence Commission facilitate access to
general, descriptive information about the international operations in
which Spain actively participates. However, there is no accurate and
clear information about the progress of Spanish participation in crisis
areas concerning what functions troops carry out at the beginning and in
later stages, if there are changes in the nature of the operation, what State
project is being defended, and the expected time horizon for operations,
among other important questions. The discourses of MPs lack coherent
analysis and foundations in international law.
35 Diary of Sessions of the Congress of Deputies. Pleno y Diputacio´n Permanente, IX
Legislature, nº 232, March 2011, 6.
36 Ibid, 10.
37 See the appearance of Gaspar Llamazares, Diary of Sessions of the Congress of Deputies,
Pleno y Diputacio´n Permanente, IX Legislature, nº 232, sesio´n plenaria nº 220, 22 March 2011.
38 Following the thesis of Marrero Rocha, ‘El discurso jurı´dico internacional’, 86.
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B. Public debates and public opinion: implications for legislative measures
Public opinion broadly accepts Spanish participation in legal and legit-
imate international operations. Specifically, it has not manifested feel-
ings against Spanish participation in the management of crisis areas, with
the exception of the Spanish Armed Forces in the intervention in Iraq.
Even when a loss of human lives has unfortunately occurred, as in the
Yak-42 air crash which killed 62 Spanish peacekeepers returning from
Afghanistan, public opinion has supported the hard work of the Spanish
Armed Forces and has penalised, where appropriate, the poor handling
of the executive branch’s defence policy.
From a global point of view, opinion surveys and polls have recorded a
high approval rating for said operations.39 There is increasingly greater
willingness and ability among European citizens to distinguish the
nature of some operations (preventive, humanitarian, observation,
among others) from others (coercive). Considering the ‘feeling’ (opinion)
of the Spanish public and the course of international dynamics, the ex-
ecutive branch has chosen to strengthen operations within the framework
of the EU and NATO.
The Transatlantic Trends report (2013) includes the fact that the
Spanish public is in favour of an increasing commitment by the EU in
the handling of international crises.40 Opinion polls show an unequivocal
support of European people, and in turn, an even greater willingness by
the Spanish for Armed Forces to participate in the handling of crisis
areas, provided that they have the consent of the Government of the
state in crisis and that the participation is preventive, humanitarian or
concerning election monitoring, and is carried out in accordance with
international law.
The acceptance of an operation changes, however, when the partici-
pation is in military operations that require the use of force, or entail a
high risk to human lives. The Spanish public supports development
cooperation policies, aid operations for natural disasters, the establish-
ment of peace, respect for human rights and international humanitarian
law, and actions against terrorism, among other operations, but is reluc-
tant for Spain to become involved in military operations that require the
use of armed force. A survey carried out in January 2016 by the Real
Instituto Elcano revealed that 51% of Spanish people supported Spanish
participation in international operations and 42% did not.41 From said
percentages it can be deduced that public opinion is polarised, due to the
perception of a serious risk and threat to Spanish troops represented by
39 See the approach of AL Alonso de Antonio, ‘Dimensio´n constitucional de la nueva Ley
Orga´nica de Defensa Nacional’ in Estudios sobre la Constitucio´n Espan˜ola. Homenaje al profesor
Jordi Sole´ Tura (Cortes Generales 2009) vol I, 297.
40 Transatlantic Trends, available at5http://www.gmfus.org/publications/transatlantic-trends-20134.
41 Baro´metro del Real Instituto Elcano (BRIE), January, 2016, 22. Information available at5http://
www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/encuesta?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT¼/elcano/
elcano_es/barometro/oleadabrie374.
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operations against international terrorism and, in particular, against the
Islamic State.
In addition to pressure from public debates in the Defence
Commission, there is also pressure from other actors in civil society,
such as the media, think-tanks, foundations, lobbying groups and not-
for-profit associations.42 Awareness campaigns increasingly help to con-
dition the executive branch in its foreign policy, to prioritise certain fora
(formal and informal), scenarios (high or low intensity), and certain con-
texts (piracy, the protection of human rights or the fight against
terrorism).
Public debates in Parliament about Spanish foreign and defence
policy, and the involvement of the public in these subjects, have had
the effect of specific legislative measures in the military field. The inter-
est of the public in guaranteeing the security of Spanish Armed Forces in
operations abroad has facilitated the passing of a series of laws, such as
Organic Law 9/2011, on the rights and duties of members of the Armed
Forces;43 Organic Law 11/2007, which regulates the rights and duties of
members of the Guardia Civil;44 the updating of the new Military Penal
Code in Organic Law 14/2015;45 and the Disciplinary Code of the
Armed Forces in Organic Law 8/2014.46
V. CONCLUSIONS
Criticisms of the participation of Spanish military forces in the interven-
tions in Kosovo and Iraq produced a new legislative framework for de-
ployment of the Armed Forces abroad. From 2005–17, Spanish military
operations have complied with both international and domestic legality.
In the case of Libya, the only operation that has required the use of force,
respect for the resolutions of the UNSC and the authorisation of
Parliament ensured that Spanish participation was in compliance with
international and domestic legality, at the same time as demonstrating
the legitimacy of said actions. There are some significant blots on such
an affirmation, however. On the one hand, the fact that the operation was
authorised only once the Spanish Armed Forces had been deployed on
the ground produced questions and criticisms about the usefulness of the
42 See on the relationship of public opinion and use of force L Klaveras, ‘The “Essential
Domino” of military operations: American public opinion and the use of force’ (2002)
International Studies Perspectives 417.
43 Organic Law 9/2011, 27 July 2011, on the rights and duties of members of the Armed Forces,
BOE nº 180, 28 July 2011.
44 Organic Law 11/2007, 22 October 2007, regulating the rights and duties of the members of the
Civil Guard, BOE nº 254, 23 October 2007.
45 Organic Law 14/2015, of 14 October 2015, of the Military Penal Code, BOE nº 247, 15
October 2015.
46 Organic Law 8/2014 of 4 December 2014 of the Disciplinary Regime of the Armed Forces,
BOE, nº 294, 5 December 2014.
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law and parliamentary control itself. The use of ex post facto authoriza-
tion may effectively disable parliamentary control. On the other hand,
the Parliament, even in offering ex post facto authorisation, may be play-
ing some role in a larger development of the law. For example, in invok-
ing the responsibility to protect, it may be contributing to a process of
changing the law on war.
Practice shows that the monitoring procedure under Organic Law
5/2005 has been frustrated by the timing of engagements and the lack
of access to relevant information. Also, the international legal situation
has left the contents of Organic Law 5/2005 out of date. New interna-
tional dynamics, new threats and new public demands for transparency
and control require a new law that will (re)define the functions of Armed
Forces in operations abroad. Nevertheless, the Organic Law is a signifi-
cant step in the democratization of Spain’s defence policy.
As is the case in other European democracies, parliamentary control
over the foreign policy of the executive branch concerning defence must
move towards a consensual model. It did not seem logical that, in an
advanced democracy, the executive branch could have the freedom to
decide on the use of Armed Forces without the prior authorisation of
Parliament. The purpose of Organic Law 5/2005 is to achieve a more
participative, transparent democracy that is close to the interest of the
public. In a subject as sensitive as the sending of troops to areas in crisis,
Spanish politicians should continue to work to achieve a consensus con-
cerning a matter that is traditionally agreed to uphold the credibility of
the executive branch and, above all, the work and professionalism of the
Spanish Armed Forces themselves. However, more information on vari-
ous matters—operational, economic, legal, among others—and more ac-
curate information at all times and under all circumstances, would be an
indication of transparency that would strengthen democratic control.
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